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Religion-Based Antitrust Exemptions: A Religious
Motivation Test
Religious freedom, as guaranteed by the first amendment,' is a
fundamental right in American society. Free market competition, as
protected by the Sherman Act, 2 is the cornerstone of the American
economic system. 3 In our complex society, conflicts between religious
freedom and free market competition are inevitable. Unfortunately,
the federal courts have not established a uniform test for deciding
when to grant a religious exemption from antitrust regulation. This
note examines the conflict between religious freedom and free market
competition. Part I examines first amendment exemptions from anti-
trust regulation, including exemptions based upon an exercise of
political rights and religion-based exemptions; Part II discusses reli-
gion-based exemptions as they have developed with regard to state
law; Part III evaluates the judicial approach toward antitrust ex-
emption claims generally, and religion-based exemption claims in
particular; and Part IV proposes a test for determining when to allow
a religious exemption from antitrust regulation.
I. First Amendment Exemptions from Antitrust Regulation
A. Right to Petition Clause
1. The Supreme Court
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Fregkt, Inc.
(N'oerr) 4 , the Supreme Court of the United States granted a political
action exemption from the Sherman Act. In Noerr, several railroads
had conducted a publicity campaign encouraging state legislation
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides in relevant part: "Congress
shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion nor prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .. "
3 The Supreme Court described the Sherman Act "as important to. . . free-enterprise
. . . as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." United
States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
4 365 U.S. 127 (1961). For a general discussion of Noer, see Fischel, Antitrzut Liabilyfor
Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrne, 45 U.
CHI. L. REv. 80 (1977); Holzer, An Analysisfor Reconciling the Antitrust Laws with the Right to
Petition: Noerr-Pennington in Light of Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 27 EMORY L. J. 673 (1978).
harmful to the trucking industry. The truckers brought suit alleging
antitrust violations grounded on the railroads' exclusively anticom-
petitive motivation and the railroads' use of a deceptive "third-
party" campaign technique.5 The Supreme Court held that "no vio-
lation of the [Sherman] Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to
influence the passage or enforcement of laws."'6 The Court estab-
lished a political activity exemption from the antitrust laws, and ap-
plied this exemption notwithstanding the railroads' anticompetitive
purpose and deceptive tactics.
The Court in Noerr advanced three reasons for the political ac-
tivity exemption: (1) the "essential dissimilarity between an agree-
ment jointly to seek legislation. . and the agreements traditionally
condemned by the [Sherman] Act"; 7 (2) the right of the people to
petition their elected representatives; and (3) the important constitu-
tional questions raised by a contrary conclusion.8 The Court stated
that a contrary conclusion would "impute to the Sherman Act a pur-
pose to regulate, not business activity, but political activity, a pur-
pose which would have no basis whatever in the legislative history of
that Act." 9
In Noerr, the Court also established a "sham exception" to the
political activity exemption.' 0 The exemption does not apply to con-
duct, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action,
which is a mere sham to cover an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor.
United Mine Workers v. Pennington"I extended the political activity
exemption to include attempts to influence administrative agencies.
In Pennington, a union and several large coal companies conspired to
eliminate smaller coal producing competitors. The union urged the
Secretary of Labor to establish a higher minimum wage for employ-
ees of coal producers selling coal to the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA), persuaded the TVA to curtail spot market purchases from
smaller coal producers, and waged a price-cutting campaign to drive
5 This technique involved propaganda material appearing to originate from independ-
ent groups, but actually coming from a single, competitive source.
6 365 U.S. at 135.
7 Id at 136.
8 Id at 138-39.
9 Id at 137 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)). Parker held that the language
and legislative history of the Sherman Act did not warrant invalidating a state regulatory
program as an unlawful trade restraint. The "state action" doctrine of Parker was the first
implied antitrust exemption. See notes 122-24 in/ra and accompanying text.
10 365 U.S. at 144.
11 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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small companies out of the spot market. The Supreme Court found
that Noerr exempted from antitrust regulation any efforts to influence
public officials regardless of intent.' 2Caifornia Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited13 reaffirmed
the first amendment right to petition public officials despite antitrust
implications. In that case, several interstate truck carriers allegedly
conspired to bring state and federal judicial proceedings to oppose
their competitors' operating rights. The Supreme Court stressed that
the Noerr political activity exemption had been based, in part, on the
first amendment right to petition the legislature and included the
right to petition the courts.' 4
Nonetheless, the Court in California Motor Transport declined to
apply the exemption. Because the carrier's activities were solely an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a com-
petitor, rather than a bona fide political activity, the Court invoked
the Noerr sham exception. '5 The claimed exercise of the carriers'
right to petition constituted a sham and was, therefore, subject to the
antitrust laws.
2. The Eighth Circuit
In Missouri v. National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW),16 the
defendant organized a campaign to boycott convention sites in states
12 Id at 670. In discussing the Noerr opinion, the Court in Pennington stated, "[n]othing
could be clearer from the Court's opinion than that anticompetitive purpose did not illegalize
the conduct there involved." Id at 669. However, as in Noerr, the Court did not specify
whether the defendant's antitrust immunity depended on the first amendment or on an inter-
pretation of the Sherman Act.
13 404 U.S. 508 (1972). The Court in Calornia Motor Transport stated it rested its decision
in Noerr on two grounds: (1) the legislative history of the Sherman Act; and (2) the right of
petition. The Court found the "same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or groups
of them to administrative agencies . . .and to courts. . . . Certainly the right to petition
extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but
one aspect of the right of petition. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969); Exparte
Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941)." 404 U.S. at 510.
14 404 U.S. at 510-11, 513.
15 Id at 515-16. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
16 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 101 S. Ct. 122 (1980). For a general discussion of
the NOW decision, see Cockerill, Application of Voerr-Pennington and the First Amendment to Polti-
call MotwatedEconomic Boycotts Missouri v. NOW, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 85 (1979); Comment,
First Amendment-Political Boycotts Are Beyond the Scope of the Sherman Act and Privileged Under the
First Amendment, 56 NOTRE DAME LAw. 326 (1980); Comment, Antitrust.- Political Activioty Im-
munefrom Sherman Act, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 130 (1980).
[June 1982]
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that had not ratified the proposed Equal Rights Amendment.1 7 Mis-
souri, alleging economic harm in its convention trade, brought suit
for antitrust violations' 8 and for tortious infliction of economic
harm. 19 On these facts the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit upheld the first amendment right to petition where
political activity conflicts with the antitrust laws. The Eighth Circuit
based it decision on the Noerr doctrine and the Sherman Act's legisla-
tive history.20
In its analysis of the prior case law, the court in NOW relied on
the Supreme Court's decision in Kor's v. Broadway-Hae Stores.2' In
Kor's, the plaintiff, an appliance store, alleged that a competitor had
conspired with manufacturers and distributors to stop selling appli-
ances to the store. The Court stressed the distinction between those
restraints subject to a rule of reason test 22 and those restraints which
by their " 'nature or character' were unduly restrictive, and hence
[per se] forbidden by both the common law and the statute. '23 The
Court, holding for the plaintiff, found that group boycotts constitute
per se violations of the Sherman Act. In dicta, however, the Court
noted that commercial boycotts could possibly be distinguished from
17 The proposed Equal Rights Amendment provides: "
Section 1: Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2: The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
Section 3: This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
18 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); Mo. REv. STAT. § 416.031.1 (1969).
19 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766B, 767 (1977).
20 620 F.2d at 1311, 1319.
21 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
22 The rule of reason test, proposed in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911),
instructs courts to consider the nature of the circumstances surrounding a particular restraint
to determine if it is "unreasonably restrictive." See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918). In Chicago Board of Trade, Justice Brandeis stated that to determine a restraint's legal-
ity, the court must consider the "facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is ap-
plied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and
its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason
for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts." Id at 238.
23 359 U.S. at 211 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58, 65 (1911)).
Restraints labeled unduly restrictive due to their nature or character are governed by the per
se rule. The Court has described the per se rule: "[T]here are certain agreements or practices
which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as
to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Northern Pac Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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non-commercial boycotts. 24
The Eighth Circuit interpreted the Klor's dicta as an indication
that "the focus of the Sherman Act is upon commercial-business ac-
tivities, and that the organization and objectives involved can make a
difference in the application of the Act."'25 The court in NOW dist-
inguished NOW from Klor's by noting that NOW concerned politi-
cally motivated conduct attempting to influence legislation, while
Klor's involved a commercial boycott among competitors.
The Eighth Circuit next cited Noerr to support its decision. Al-
though recognizing factual distinctions between Noerr and NOW,
such as "the use of a boycott and the injury of a noncompetitor (Mis-
souri) by a noncompetitor (NOW)," 26 the Eighth Circuit found the
distinctions to be irrelevant in assessing the Sherman Act's applica-
bility. The determinative issue was the political purpose behind the
NOW boycott.27 The court characterized the boycott as a political
tool for influencing the government in the same manner as the pub-
licity campaign in Noerr. Any harm which the boycott caused to
Missouri's convention industry was merely incidental to NOW's at-
tempt to influence legislation. The Eighth Circuit held that NOW's
activities were not within the intended scope of the Sherman Act. 28
The court concluded that Congress "indicated" that the Sherman
Act concerned "competitors in commerce . . . not noncompetitors
motivated socially or politically in connection with legislation."'29
In rejecting Missouri's intentional tort claim, the Eighth Circuit
found NOW's boycott to be a valid exercise of the first amendment
right to petition: "We . . .find sufficient support in Noerr and the
subsequent cases of the Supreme Court which refer to Noerr to sup-
port the conclusion that the right to petition is of such importance
that it is not an improper interference even when exercised by way of
a boycott."' 30 Although the court stated that it relied upon the Sher-
24 359 U.S. at 213 n.7.
25 620 F.2d at 1311. However, the court stated, "we do not rest our decision in this case
upon the basis that the boycott was noncommercial and non-economic. Our decision is based
upon the right to use political activities to petition the government, as was the underlying
factor in Noerr." Id at 1315 n.16.
26 Id at 1315-16.
27 The court stated, "the crux of the issue is that NOW was politically motivated to use a
boycott to influence ratification of the ERA." Id at 1314. The court determined that the
political motivation of the NOW boycott brought it within the overriding policy considera-
tions of Moerr. Id at 1316.
28 Id
29 Id at 1309.
30 Id at 1317.
LJune 19821
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man Act's legislative history to find NOW's activities exempt from
antitrust regulation, its holding on the tort claim indicated its con-
current reliance on the first amendment right to petition.3 1
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Gibson contended that Noerr
must be narrowly construed and stated that the factual distinctions
between Noerr and NOW "mandate that the court. . . undertake a
more comprehensive balancing of the important issues."'32 He
stressed that Noerr should not be interpreted to automatically exempt
politically motivated boycotts from antitrust regulation. Finally,
Judge Gibson found that the majority opinion ignored the most criti-
cal issue by assuming, without sufficient analysis, that NOW's actions
constituted an exercise of first amendment rights.33
B. Free Exercise of Religion Clause
1. The Ninth Circuit
In Swan v. First Church of Christ, Scientist,34 the Ninth Circuit
found that disseminating religious writing had "no resemblance to
the various activities which have been recognized as 'trade or com-
merce' under the [Sherman Act]." 35 A writer of religious works had
claimed that the Christian Scientist Church, its board of directors,
and publishing society conspired to prevent circulation of his book to
church members. The court held that "[a]ll religious organizations
31 Id at 1316. The court's language in its concluding paragraph appears to apply the
first amendment to both claims. Id at 1319.
32 Id at 1324 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting). Judge Gibson emphatically stated, "Noenr sim-
ply does not imply the conclusion that the first amendment immunizes politically motivated
boycotts against antitrust attack." Id (footnote omitted). See Note, Political Boycoll Activity
and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 659 (1978).
33 Id at 1320 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting). In a footnote, the dissent stated: "The District
Court states: '[T]he issue in this case. . . is whether NOW's actions, which are themselves an
exercise of first amendment rights, constitute a violation of the Sherman Act.'. .. Indeed,
this formulation of the issue would almost seem rhetorical. Obviously, first amendment pro-
tected activities cannot be outlawed by Congress." Id at 1320 n.3 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting).
34 225 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1955). See Watch Tower Bible and Tract Soc. v. Dougherty,
337 Pa. 286, 11 A.2d 147 (1940). Watch Tower Bible, a common law antitrust decision, in-
volved a secondary boycott. Plaintiff conducted programs over a radio station owned by a
department store. The defendants, Catholic clergy, found the programs offensive and organ-
ized protests against the store. The station then refused to renew plaintiff's contract. The
court, denying plaintiff's claim for damages, stated that "[a] right of action does not arise
merely because a group withdraws its patronage or threatens to do so and induces others to
do likewise where the objects sought to be obtained are legitimate." 337 Pa. at 288, 11 A.2d
at 148. Because the court did not discuss the religion clauses, this case does not control the
present conflict. See Kuryer Pub. Co. v. Messmer, 162 Wis. 565, 156 N.W. 948 (Wis. 1916).
35 225 F.2d at 751 (citing United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1955)). Shubert
discussed the broad interpretation given to "trade or commerce."
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claim the unrestricted right to designate which writings shall be ac-
cepted by their members. In this they are protected from State inter-
ference by the first amendment. '36 Therefore, the court concluded
that conduct motivated solely by religious concerns is exempt from
antitrust regulation.
2. The D.C. Circuit
Twenty-five years after Swan, in Costello Publishing Co. v.John E.
Rotelle,3 7 the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia followed Swan and refused to apply the antitrust laws to relig-
iously motivated conduct. 38 In Costello, a publishing company
declined to comply with the mandatory Episcopal liturgical text ap-
proval process. Episcopal officials then asked Catholic book dealers
not to distribute the unapproved book. The publishing company
contended that the Episcopal officials' conduct had violated the
Sherman Act. However, the district court rejected that contention,
and cited NOW as holding that "the antitrust laws are intended to
apply solely within a commercial competitive framework. '3 9 The
court held the defendant's actions, motivated exclusively by religious
concerns, had no commercially competitive design. "Such religiously
motivated conduct," stated the court, "is not the type which falls
within the realm of the antitrust laws . "40
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit reversed the district court and held that no blanket religious an-
titrust exemption exists. 41 The D.C. Circuit based its decision on
statutory and constitutional considerations. In its statutory analysis,
the court stressed that only actions producing an anticompetitive ef-
fect violate the antitrust laws. Since the trial court had granted sum-
mary judgment, this issue had not yet been explored.
With respect to the constitutional issues, the D.C. Circuit con-
36 225 F.2d at 750-51.
37 No. 76-1930 (D.D.C. August 22, 1980).
38 Id, slip op. at 3-4. The Court also concluded that the free exercise clause prohibited
review of ecclesiastical decisions (citing Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696 (1976)). See note 108 in/fa.
39 Id at 4.
40 Id
41 Costello Pub. Co. v. John E. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In a footnote,
the court stated the antitrust issues "might seem easier" if the case did not involve a religious
publication and an organization affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. The court be-
lieved the case appeared more difficult because the Church's market power derives in large
part from religious rather than economic factors. Nevertheless, the court contended, "setting
an exchange rate between religious and economic factors is theoretically no more difficult
than putting a price on advertising." Id at 1047 n.22.
LJune 1982]
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sidered both the Noerr and Wisconsin v. Yoder 42 line of cases and deter-
mined that neither required an absolute antitrust exemption for
religiously-motivated conduct. The court recognized that Costello in-
volved first amendment issues similar to those in Noerr.43 The court
distinguished Costello from Noerr on the grounds that the first amend-.
ment issue in Costello was "double-edged. '44 While the "political
participatory rights guaranteed by the [f]irst [a]mendment all seek to
further political activity . . . the religious rights guaranteed seek to
protect religious liberties, but prohibit state establishment of reli-
gion."'45 Although Noerr and Costello involved actions concerning the
first amendment, the court stated that the extent to which the actions
do concern the first amendment is uncertain. 46 The court also noted
that "the countervailing economic considerations depend upon the
extent to which the concerns of the antitrust laws are implicated by
the activity challenged. ' 47 Thus, according to the D.C. Circuit, reli-
gious freedom and competition must be placed on a continuum and
carefully balanced to resolve properly any conflict between these two
important interests. 48
The D.C. Circuit criticized the trial court for basing its decision
solely on the defendant's motives. It determined that while courts
must consider the nature of the motivation in granting an antitrust
exemption, a "good motive" 49 finding is not conclusive. The circuit
court stated:
[T]he district court must initially determine if the economic
pressure brought by the church is legitimately geared to the
church's protection of its liturgy rather than its survival in the mar-
ketplace of religious books . . . . But even assuming that the
Church's activity is a genuine expression of the right to exercise
42 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The court, using a balancing test, granted a religious exemption
from compulsory education for members of the Amish faith. See text accompanying notes 91-
96 infra.
Unlike the district court, the circuit court did not discuss Swan v. First Church of Christ,
Scientist, 225 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1955).
43 The court also cited NOW and Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 492 F. Supp. 334 (D. Mass. 1980) (hereinafter ILA). In ILA, the court held
a concerted refusal to load ships engaged in trade with the U.S.S.R. because of the Soviet
Union's invasion of Afghanistan did not violate the antitrust laws.
44 670 F.2d at 1048.
45 Id
46 Id (comparing Caliomia Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at 511-15, with Noerr, 365 U.S. at
127).
47 670 F.2d at 1049 (citing NOW, 620 F.2d at 1312).
48 670 F.2d at 1049.
49 Id The court failed to distinguish adequately between a "good" motive and a "'reli-
gious" motive.
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freely, there are still limits on the tactics that may be used to ac-
complish its ends . . .50
The court first noted that while the freedom to believe is abso-
lute, the freedom to act in pursuit of religious beliefs remains subject
to regulation. 5 1 Relying on Yoder, the D.C. Circuit found that
"neither religious (free exercise) nor social (antitrust) interests are to-
tally free from a 'balancing process.' "52 The D.C. Circuit held that
where religious expression conflicts with antitrust law, a court must
balance the nature and extent of the antitrust violations against the
religious motivation in determining whether to grant an antitrust
exemption.53
II. Religion-Based Exemptions in Perspective
A. Defining Religion Under the F'rst Amendment
1. Established Religions v. Personal Conscience
The Supreme Court has not specifically outlined a standard for
determining a legitimate claim of exemption based upon the free ex-
ercise of religion. From rather narrow early definitions of religion,
54
50 Id at 1049-50.
51 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1879). See also text accompanying notes 72-74 infra.
52 670 F.2d at 1049.
53 Id at 1050. The circuit court remanded the case for determination of certain counter-
claims. However, the circuit court offered the district court "guidelines" on the antitrust
issue. Id at 1046. Thus, the circuit court's language concerning the antitrust issue, although
dicta, remains as precedent in the D.C. Circuit.
The court recognized that the balancing would not be easy and might "run afoul of the
ban against state entanglement in religious affairs." Id at 1050. Thus, the circuit court sug-
gested the district court defer the constitutional question until all other issues had been de-
cided. In a footnote, the D.C. Circuit recognized the district court's concern that any
antitrust scrutiny would entangle it in ecclesiastical decisions. However, the D.C. Circuit
stated:
It is not yet clear. . . whether or to what degree that is necessarily true. Cer-
tainly the court must be cautious not to entangle itself in the decision-making pro-
cess of the Church with regard to its religious obligations, hut that concern should
not block the court from at least considering the market impact of the activity in
the first place in order to assess its antitrust effects. Further, if antitrust violations
should be found, the court must, of course, be sensitive to the nature of the religious
organizations involved in prescribing any antitrust remedies that might be war-
ranted as well as in weighing competing [flirst [a]mendment and antitrust interests.
Id at 1050 n.31.
54 In 1890, the Court stated, "[t]he term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his
relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and
character, and of obedience to his will." Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). The
court later expanded its definition to include nontheistic religions in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961), and unusual beliefs in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
[June 1982]
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the Court expanded the definition55 to its broadest application in
United States v. Seeger.56 In Seeger, the Court granted a conscientious
objector religious exemption from military service. The Court used
an "objective" test for defining religion: "[D]oes the claimed belief
occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief
in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption?"5 7
While the Seeger court only interpreted the term "religious belief" as
used in the Selective Service Act,58 it adopted personal philosophy
and morality as the functional equivalent to religion.
Recent decisions have placed greater emphasis on established
churches than on individual beliefs, -suggesting that the Court is
again narrowing its definition of religion. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the
Court indicated it favored the beliefs of established churches over
personal conscience beliefs.59 In Yoder, Chief Justice Burger stated:
[I]f [religious organizations assert] their claims because of their
subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular val-
ues accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social
55 See Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961), where the Court stated that "neither
a State nor the Federal Government can force a person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion.' Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all reli-
gions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the
existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs." Id at 495. In a
footnote, the Court included Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular Humanism as
examples of religions which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in God's
existence. Id at 495 n. 11.
56 380 U.S. 163 (1965). The Court also granted a conscientious objector exemption in
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
57 380 U.S. at 184.
58 Universal Military. Training and Service Act § 6(), 50 U.S.C. § 456 (j) (1970). This
Act exempts from combat service individuals who are conscientiously opposed to participa-
tion in war by reason of their "religious training and belief." The Act states that "religious
training and belief" does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views
or a merely personal moral code. While the Court stated that Congress, in using the expres-
sion "Supreme Being" rather than "God," was merely clarifying the meaning of religious
training and belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially political, sociologi-
cal, or philosophical views, the Court's definition allows personal beliefs to be treated identi-
cally to religious beliefs. 380 U.S. at 165.
Justice Douglas recognized the Court's broad definition of religion in both Seeger and
Welsh in his Yoder dissenting opinion. He criticized the Yoder majority for "retreating" from
that broad ."philosophical and personal" religious definition. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 247-49 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 62 infa.
59 See Kurland, The Supreme .Court, Compulsoy Education, and the First Amendment's Religion
Clause, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 213 (1973). Professor Kurland discusses the Court's "devotion to
the rights of churches rather than the rights of individual conscience" and advocates a com-
promise. He contends that if the two religion clauses were read separately, "the freedom
clause [could speak] for the protection of individual conscience and the establishment clause
[could speak] for a ban on assistance, not to individuals, but to churches." Id at 241.
NOTES
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims
would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philo-
sophical and personal rather than religious, and such a belief does
not rise to the demands of the [r]eligion [c]lauses. 60
In his dissent, Justice Douglas interpreted the majority opinion
as both broadening and limiting religious freedom. Noting the
Court's increasing support for religion-based claims, he stated:
"What we do today. . . opens the way to give organized religion a
broader base than it has ever enjoyed; and it even promises that in
time Reynolds will be overruled."' 6' Justice Douglas argued that the
Court retreated when, in reference to Henry David Thoreau, it
stated his choice was philosophical rather than religious and thus not
protected by the religion clauses. He found this contrary to the
Court's decision in Seeger.62 Justice Douglas argued that while the
Court was broadening free exercise protections, it was narrowing the
definition of religion which was the basis for applying those
protections.
2. Importance, Sincerity, and Historical Basis of Religious Beliefs
Because the Supreme Court has not clearly defined "religion,"
courts consider any of three factors when analyzing religious claims.
The courts evaluate the importance, sincerity, and historical basis of
the religious belief.63
In the importance analysis, courts distinguish between activities
central to a religious belief and those characterized as merely inci-
dental. 64 For example, in Sherbert v. erner,65 the Supreme Court la-
beled the Sabbath observance as a "cardinal principle" of the
Seventh-Day Adventist faith. 66 Similarly, in sustaining a religious
exemption from state drug laws, the California decision in People v.
60 406 U.S. at 216.
61 Id at 247. See text accompanying notes 72-74 infra.
62 See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
63 Although the Court has stated, "it is no business of courts to say what is a religious
practice or activity for one group is not religion under the protection of the [f]irst
[a]mendment," Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953), courts do classify religious
activities.
64 Courts sometimes use sacramental significance as a factor in determining centrality.
See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716,
394 P.2d 813,40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). Other times, the relative interference of the regulated
conduct is considered a factor. In Yoder the Court stated that secondary schooling "contra-
venes the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish Faith." 406 U.S. at 218.
65 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
66 Id at 406.
[June 19821
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Wy6oo7j6 noted that: (1) peyote (a controlled substance) played a
"central role" in the religious organization's ceremony and practice;
and (2) the "ceremony marked by the sacramental use of peyote,
composes the cornerstone of the peyote religion. ' 68 On the other
hand, the Fifth Circuit has held that marijuana does not constitute a
central tenet of Hinduism.69
Courts also examine the sincerity of the claimant's belief. In
United States v. Seeger, the Supreme Court stated: "[W]e. . . empha-
size that while the 'truth' of a belief is not open to question, there
remains the significant question whether it is 'truly held.' This is the
threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every
case."
'70
In Yoder, the Supreme Court also inquired into the historical
and organizational basis of the religion. Yoder stressed that the
Amish were "[a]ided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable
sect and a long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of
American society ....
B. Evolution of Religious Exemptions From State Law
In 1878, the Supreme Court decided Reynolds v. United States,72
its first religious exemption claim case. Reynolds, a practicing Mor-
mon, sought an exemption from a state law forbidding polygamy.
The Mormon Church, under certain conditions, advocated polyg-
amy as part of its religious practices. The Supreme Court rejected
the proposed first amendment exemption from state law for relig-
iously motivated polygamy. It held that only religious beliefs, not'
religiously motivated actions, warranted constitutional protection7 3
67 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 814, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
68 Id at 719, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
69 Leavy v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967).
70 380 U.S. at 185.
71 406 U.S. at 235. Professor Kurland argues that what impressed the Yoder Court the
most about the desire of the Amish to live life simply without state interference was what the
Chief Justice constantly referred to as their "success." Kurland, supra note 59 at 235-36. If
the Court does place great emphasis upon the "success" of the religious group, a religious
claim evaluation would clearly favor well-established, organized religions. This supports a
religion-based antitrust exemption claim because a religious antitrust exemption will only be
sought by a successful, organized religious group..See text accompanying notes 127-30 inka.
72 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
73 Id at 166.
Commentators find little merit in the belief-action distinction. See, e.g., Giannella, Reli
gious Liberty, Nonestablishment andDoctinalDevelopment, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1387-89 (1969);
Marcus, The Forum of Consdence: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DUKE L.
J. 1217, 1233-35.
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Although the Constitution guaranteed individuals absolute freedom
in their religious beliefs, the state possessed the power to regulate an
individual's religious conduct.74
Forty years later, however, the Court eroded the belief-action
distinction.75 The Court granted religious exemptions based not on
the free exercise clause but on the free speech clause. 6 In Board of
Education v. Barnette,7 7 the Court upheld the Jehovah's Witnesses'
right not to be compelled to participate in flag salute exercises. Jeho-
vah's Witnesses brought suit seeking to restrain enforcement of a
compulsory flag salute regulation. The Witnesses, believing the law
of God is superior to all laws enacted by government, also believe
man should not serve any other symbol or image. Because they con-
sider the flag an "image," they refuse to salute it. The Court invali-
dated the regulation. 78 It framed the issue as a general constitutional
question and denied the relevancy of the religious issue.7 9 However,
upholding the Jehovah's Witnesses' claim required the Court to over-
rule an earlier compulsory flag salute decision which had rejected a
claim based on religious beliefs.80 Although for the next twenty years
the Court accorded religious expression protection under the free
speech clause, it continually emphasized the importance of protect-
ing religious freedom.81
In Braunfeld v. Brown,82 the Supreme Court considered the claim
74 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S; 296 (1940), restated the belief-action distinction:
"[T]he Amendment embraces two concepts - freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be." Id at 303-04.
75 See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938).
76 See Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEo. L.J. 1115, 1124-1130 (1973). Profes-
sor Pfeffer contends that a free exercise claim, unsupported by other first amendment claims,
did not merit protection.
77 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See also Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). Struthers involved an ordinance forbidding door-to-door solici-
tation of handbills. A Jehovah's Witness argued that the ordinance violated the right of
freedom of press and religion. The Court declared the ordinance unconstitutional because it
conflicted with freedom ofpress and speech. Id at 149.
In his concurring opinion in Fowler, Justice Frankfurter rejected the free exercise clause
as the basis for invalidating a law discriminating against a particular religious group, stating
that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment condemned it. 345 U.S. at 70
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
78 319 U.S. at 633.
79 Id at 632.
80 See Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
81 See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 US.
268 (1951); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 575-78 (1944); Martin v. Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1943).
82 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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of Orthodox Jews seeking a religious exemption from compulsory
Sunday closing laws. The Orthodox Jewish faith requires its mem-
bers to close business on Saturday. The claimants argued the Sun-
day closing laws interfered with their religious freedom by subjecting
them to serious economic disadvantages. Denying the exemption,
the Court distinguished between legislation which makes the reli-
gious practice itself illegal and legislation which imposes only an in-
direct restriction on religious freedom. The Court held that
legislation which imposes an indirect burden is constitutional unless
the state can accomplish its purpose by a less restrictive alternative.83
In Sherbert v. Verner8 4 the Supreme Court rendered its first deci-
sion upholding a free exercise claim not supported by the free speech
clause. The Court found that a state could not constitutionally deny
unemployment compensation to a Sabbatarian who refused to ac-
cept employment requiring him to work on Saturday. 85 The 1963
opinion held that only a compelling state interest could justify impos-
ing a burden on the free exercise of religion.86
In the 1970 Supreme Court decision in Waz v. Tax Commission,8 7
a property owner contended that property tax exemptions granted to
religious organizations violated the establishment clause.8 8 Recog-.
nizing the inevitable struggle in seeking a neutral course between the
two religion clauses, 9 the Court noted that constitutional neutrality
83 Id at 607.
84 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
85 Justice Brennan, a dissenter in Braunfeld, wrote the opinion in Sherbert. He attempted
to distinguish the two decisions on the grounds that a compelling state interest existed in
Braunfeld in providing a uniform day of rest while no compelling state interest existed in
Sherbert. Id at 408. Justice Brennan also noted that granting the exemption in Brawifeld
would have presented a difficult administrative problem or allowed the exempted class a
great competitive advantage. Id at 408-09.
86 Id at 403.
The Sherbert court cited NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) and Thomas v. Collins,
343 U.S. 516 (1945) for its compelling state interest test. 374 U.S. at 398, 403, 406. The
Sherbert court cited Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60
(1960); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); and Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)
for its less restrictive alternative test. 374 at U.S. 398, 407-08. None of these cases involved
religious freedom but were based on other first amendment freedoms.
87 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
88 The Court noted that the tax exemption statute did not single out one particular
church or religious group or even churches in general. Rather, it granted exemption to all
religious houses within a broad class of property owned by non-profit, quasi-public corpora-
tions which include hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical and
patriotic groups. Id at 672-73.
89 The Court recognized that in attempting to articulate the scope of the two religion
clauses, the Court's opinions reflect the limitations inherent in formulating general lrinciples
on a case-by-case basis. Id at 668.
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in the area could not be an absolutely straight line. The Court
adopted a new standard, "benevolent neutrality," and held that an
exemption indirectly benefitting religion does not violate the estab-
lishment clause. 90
In Wconsz v. Yoder, 9' the Supreme Court faced a conflict be-
tween Amish religious beliefs and state compulsory education laws.
The Court adopted a balancing test92 but required a compelling state
interest in order to overcome the religious claim. 93 Holding for the
Amish defendant, the court noted that the state had not shown a
compelling state interest.
The Court in Yoder also rejected arguments against a religious
exemption based on the neutrality concept 94 and the establishment
clause. 95 The court stated:
A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, none-
theless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neu-
trality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion . . . . The
Court must not ignore the danger that an exception from a general
obligation of citizenship on religious grounds rmay run afoul of the
[e]stablishment [c]lause, but that danger cannot be allowed to pre-
vent any exception no matter how vital it may be to the protection
90 Id at 669.
The Court explained the "benevolent neutrality" standard:
Each value judgment under the [r]eligion [c]lauses must . .. turn on whether
particular acts in question are intended to establish or interfere with religious be-
liefs and practices or have the effect of doing so. Adherence to the policy of neutral-
ity that derives from an accommodation of the [e]stablishment and [flree [e]xercise
[c]lauses has prevented the kind of involvement that would tip the balance toward
government control of churches or governmental restraint on religious practice.
Id at 669-70.
91 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
92 Id at 214. A recent commentator, criticizing the courts' inconsistency in outlining a
balancing test, explained that some cases apply a modified balancing test while others apply a
"true" balancing test. Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause. A Model of Com-
peting Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 354 n.31 (1980). Under the two-tiered, modified test, in
which a sufficient degree of religious interest triggers a burden on the state to demonstrate a
compelling state interest and the lack of a less restrictive alternative, if the burden is met, the
statute is valid. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); Johnson v. Motor
Vehicle Div., 197 Colo. 455, 458, 593 P.2d 1363, 1365, cert denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979). Under
a "true" balancing test, although it also requires a threshold religious interest as a trigger, the
court undertakes a detailed consideration of the relative weights of the religious and state
interests. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d
716, 725, 394 P.2d 813, 820, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76 (1964).
93 See notes 84-86 supra and accompanying text.
94 See text accompanying notes 89-90 supra.
95 The establishment clause requires that statutes have a secular legislative purpose, have
a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and not foster exces-
sive entanglement with religion. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1977).
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of values promoted by the right of free exercise. 96
III. Judicial Approaches to Antitrust Exemption Claims:
A Critique
The debate continues among commentators and within the
courts concerning the proper judicial standard for antitrust exemp-
tion claims. The conflict is between an absolutist approach and a
balancing approach.
The absolutist approach adopted in Noerr holds that a concerted
attempt to influence legislation through a publicity campaign merits
an antitrust exemption. NOW may establish a doctrine independent
of Noerr and accord political boycotts absolute antitrust immunity
when the boycott's sole purpose is to influence governmental ac-
tion.9 7 An alternative jiudicial response might distinguish between
commercial and non/ nmercial boycotts and apply separate rules to
the two different boycott types.98 Although one commentator main-
tains that all boycott regardless of their motivation, should be con-
sidered per se violations-of the Sherman Act, 99 the lower courts have
held that only commercial-boycotts are illegal per se. 00 Several com-
mentators have concluded that noncommercial group boycotts may
not merit per se treatment' 0 ' and NOW suggests that noncommercial
96 406 U.S. at 220-21 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
97 A recent commentator on the NOW decision interpreted NOW in this manner. Com-
ment, First Amendment - Political Boycotts are Beond the Scope of the Sherman Act and -Privileged Under
the First Amendment, 56 NOTRE DAME LAw. 326, 330 (1980).
98 Some commentators contend that group boycotts in a non-commercial context may
not be per se violations of the Sherman Act. See Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refisals to
Deak A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1979); McCormick, Group Boycott
- Per Se or Not Per Se, That Is the Question, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 685 (1979); Comment, Protest
Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1131 (1980). However, one commentator
argues that all boycotts merit per se treatment regardless of their. motivation. See Bird, Sher-
man Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted Refusals to Deal, 1970 DUKE LJ. 247.
Per se violations of the Sherman Act "are certain agreements or practices which because
of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1976) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958)).
99 See Bird, supra note 98.
100 See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1177-91 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Feminist
Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 546-47 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 924 (1979); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National Bank Americard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119,
127-30 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Insurance Bd., 188 F.
Supp. 949, 955 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
101 See Bauer, supra note 98; McCormick, supra note 98; Comment, supra note 98.
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boycotts should be treated differently than commercial boycotts.
The issue, however, is not yet settled.
In contrast to the absolute exemption from antitrust regulation
which the Noerr and NOW cases establish, the dissents in NOW and
Costello argue for a traditional first amendment balancing test. Sup-
port for balancing first amendment rights against governmental in-
terests can be found in various Supreme Court decisions.' 0 2 Judge
Gibson, dissenting in NOW, contended the balancing analysis is nec-
essary "to assure consistent evaluation of similar claims."'10 3
A. Problems With a Balancing Test
Because applying a balancing test to religion-based antitrust ex-
emptions allows the courts to reach unpredictable and inconsistent
results, courts should adopt a different test. While courts have
granted various religion-based exemptions using a balancing test, 0 4
they have also drawn questionable distinctions in these decisions.
The compelling state interest found in Braunfeld, yet not in Sherbert,
exemplifies this problem. 0 5 Applying the rationale behind these dis-
tinctions in subsequent cases is difficult.
A balancing test also provides little guidance to lower courts.
Courts might follow the trend favoring political action antitrust ex-
emptions and religion-based exemptions from other laws, but this
does not eliminate the need for an articulated standard. A growing
number of religious organizations and a volatile economy suggest the
possibility of increased litigation in this area. Lower courts need spe-
cific legal standards to judge claims of religion-based exemptions
from antitrust laws. A balancing test leads to subjective evaluations
rather than application of objective standards. 10 6
Another problem with the balancing test suggested in Costello is
that the more successful religion-based boycotts have a greater
chance of being declared illegal. The Costello test requires courts to
assess the market impact of the antitrust violations in balancing them
102 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
103 620 F.2d at 1324.
104 See Shetreet, Exemptions and Pivileges on Grounds of Religion and Conscience, 22 Ky. LJ. 377
(1974); Note, supra note 92.
This Note does not challenge the traditional balancing test used to evaluate religious
exemptions from other government regulations. Rather, the thesis is that a balancing test
should not be used in evaluating religious exemptions from antitrust regulation.
105 See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
106 Professor Giannella, however, contends that an ad hoc judgment can be subjected to
"more or less objective criteria." See Giannella, supra note 73, at 1384.
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against the religious goal. 10 7 A well-organized boycott will more
strongly affect the market than a disorganized one. The resulting
success may tip the balance toward the antitrust regulation and away
from the religious exemption. Subjecting one religious group to anti-
trust regulation solely because of its organizational capabilities, while
exempting a more disorganized religious group, creates equal protec-
tion problems and infringes upon an individual's personal religious
choice.
B. Problems With Current Standards For Classif/jing Religions
The judiciary's current approach for evaluating religion-based
exemption claims remains unsettled. Although the Supreme Court
has adopted a balancing test, its initial evaluation of the importance,
sincerity, and historical basis of the religious claim presents problems.
Under any exemption analysis, courts must determine when religious
interests are present. Yet, courts currently exceed reasonable inquiry
and attempt to classify religions without articulating an objective
standard. 0 8
In the importance analysis, the inquiry into centrality necessar-
ily involves an evaluation of vague doctrinal beliefs. 10 9 The central-
ity distinction, one commentator correctly notes, is "beyond the
practical and institutional competence of courts."'"10 Even dedicated
church leaders have difficulty articulating their religion's "cardinal
principles.""' Certainly, courts, unfamiliar with the detailed princi-
ples of various religions, should not be expected to make this
evaluation. "12
107 See 670 F.2d at 1050.
108 The Court's hesitation in articulating a standard might be based, in part, on its justi-
fied reluctance to consider essentially ecclesiastical decisions. See, e.g., Serbian Orthodox Dio-
cese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). Cf Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S.
440 (1969) (possibility of "marginal civil court review" in cases challenging decisions of ec-
celesiastical tribunals as products of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness.); Gonzalez v. Arch-
bishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
109 See Kurland supra note 59.
110 See Note supra note 92, at 360.
111 Professor Konvitz notes that sometimes there are disputes within a religion as to what
constitutes a central tenet. M. KoNvrrz, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE 77-79
(1968).
112 The Supreme Coi.rt recently recognized that intrafaith differences concerning re-
quired beliefs and practices "are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed, and
the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences in relation to the
Religion Clauses. . . . [T]he guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are
shared by all members of a religious sect. Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not within
the judicial function and . . . competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow
worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbi-
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A court must also inquire into the religious claimants' sincerity;
allowing an exemption for an insincere claim dilutes the fundamen-
tal importance attached to religious freedom. However, distinguish-
ing what is believed from what is believable requires a judgment
likely to be determined by the judge's personal religious convic-
tions." 3 The sincerity issue, therefore, should be considered only af-
ter the court has recognized the existence of a valid religious claim
and not as a factor in that existence.
Lastly, the Court's inquiry into the historical and organizational
basis of the religion may be criticized for favoring established reli-
gions and restricting the church's right to change or -interpret its
doctrine.
C. Supreme Court Trend Favorng Religious Exemption Claims
Although the Supreme Court has not adopted an acceptable
standard for evaluating religious exemption claims, its decisions in
Sherbert, Waz, and Yoder clearly indicate a trend favoring religious
exemptions.
The Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert extends its earlier
Braunfeld decision. The Braunfeld religious exemption required no af-
firmative action by the state. In contrast, the grant of a religious
exemption in Sherbert required that the state pay benefits. By grant-
ing an exemption in Sherbert, the Court imposed an affirmative duty
on the state. Notwithstanding Braunfeld's contrary precedent, the
Court in Sherbert strongly supported the religious &xemption. Thus,
Sherbert is the first indication of the Supreme Court's recognition of
" religious exemptions' importance. 14
ters of scriptural interpretation." Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec., 101 S. Ct.
1425, 1431 (1981).
113 Justice Jackson, in a dissenting opinion, criticized the majority for undertaking a
sincerity inquiry:
As a matter of either practice or philosophy I do not see how we can separate
an issue as to what is believed from considerations as to what is believable. The
most convincing proof that one believes his statements is to show that they have
been true in his experience. Likewise, that one knowingly falsified is best proved by
showing that what he said happened never did happen. How can the Government
prove these persons knew something to be false which it cannot prove to be false? If
we try religious sincerity severed from religious verity, we isolate the dispute from
the very considerations which in common experience provide its most reliable
answer.
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92-93 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
114 Professor Pfeffer labeled Sherbert as the "turning point" in the ranking of values be-
tween free exercise and free speech interests. He contended that until Yoder was decided, it
was not certain whether Sherbert was an isolated opinion. See Pfeffer, supra note 76 at 1139-40.
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The Waz decision is also important precedent favoring a reli-
gious exemption from antitrust regulation. First, Waz severely
weakens any argument that a religious antitrust exemption violates
the establishment clause. In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Bur-
ger declared: "[T]he limits of permissible state accommodation to
religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference man-
dated by the free exercise clause. To equate the two would be to
deny a national heritage with roots in the Revolution itself."' I1 5
Thus, the Chief Justice noted the historical importance of the reli-
gion clauses and recognized that the importance should continue.
The opinion further indicated that the free exercise of religion be
accorded great weight when the possibility of state interference with
free exercise arises.
Secondly, in Wa/z, the Supreme Court expressly approved a reli-
gious exemption in a traditionally heavily regulated economic area.
Although the legislative history in Walz specifically provided for a
tax exemption, 16 the discussions in Noerr and NOW of the Sherman
Act's legislative history support an analogous implied antitrust ex-
emption.' 1 7 In Noerr, the Supreme Court noted the Sherman Act was
not intended to regulate political activity. The Court stated that the
right to petition is protected by the Bill of Rights and courts cannot
"lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms."l' S
This rationale applies equally well to the right of religious freedom.
In NOW, the Eighth Circuit examined the legislative history and
quoted Mr. Sherman, the Act's sponsor: "[S]uch an association
[churches, schools, or any other kind of moral or education associa-
tion] is not in any sense a combination or arrangement made to inter-
The Supreme Court recently affirmed the Sherbert decision. The Court held that denying
unemployment benefits to a claimant who terminated his job because his religious beliefs
forbad participation in arms production violated the first amendment right to free exercise of
religion. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec., 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981).
115 397 U.S. at 673. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 423 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961). See generaly KAUPER, THE CONSTITU-
TIONALITY OF TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS AcGrivrriEs IN THE WALL BETWEEN
CHURCH AND STATE (D. Oaks ed. 1963).
116 N.Y. Const. Art. 16, § I provides in relevant part:
Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemptions
may be altered or repealed except those exempting real or personal property used
exclusively for religious, educational or charitable purposes as defined by law and
owned by any corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for one
or more of such purposes and not operating for profit.
117 However, the Supreme Court has held there-is a presumption against implied exclu-
sions from antitrust regulation. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389 (1978); text accompanying notes 122-24 infra.
118 365 U.S. at 138.
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fere with [the Sherman Act] . ... ,l19 The court in NOW
recognized that the legislative history provided an "indication"'' 20
that the Act applied to "competitors in commerce. . . not noncom-
petitors motivated socially or politically in connection with
legislation."121
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has held there is a presumption
against implied exemptions from antitrust regulation.12 2 Yet, the
Court has expressly recognized two categories of implied exemptions:
state action and political action.1 23 In discussing implied antitrust
exemptions, the Court recently stated, "[c]ommon to the [exemp-
tions] was potential conflict with policies of signal importance in our
national traditions and governmental structure of federalism." 24
Religious freedom certainly falls into this category.
The Supreme Court reiterated its policy favoring religious ex-
emptions in Yoder. Yoder stressed the fundamental importance of a
free exercise religious exemption and the relative unimportance of
establishment clause neutrality.1 25 While it also narrowed, as Justice
Douglas' dissent noted, the guidelines for defining religion,1 26 this
119 620 F.2d at 1309, (quoting E. KITNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 250-52 (1978)).
120 Id
121 Id
122 See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). In his dissent in
NOW, Judge Gibson stressed this point as favoring a balancing test. 620 F.2d at 1320 (Gib-
son, C.J., dissenting).
123 The Court recognized the state action exclusion in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 431
(1943) and the political action exclusion in Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Mo-
tor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
124 435 U.S. at 400. The Court pointed out, however, that even the recognized exclusions
have been unavailing to prevent antitrust enforcement which, though implicating fundamen-
tal policies, did not severely impinge upon them. Id (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773 (1975); California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508
(1972)). The Court in Lafayette also stated that it is necessary to demonstrate "countervailing
policies which are sufficiently weighty to overcome the presumption." 435 U.S. at 400.
125 406 U.S. at 220-21. In Foder, the Court stated, "[we] must not ignore the danger that
an exception from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of
the Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot be allowed to prevent any exception no
matter how vital it may be to the protection of values promoted by the right of free exercise."
Id
126 See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra. In a recent free exercise exemption case, the
Court avoided the "difficult and delicate task" of determing what constitutes a religious belief
by adopting the lower tribunal's finding that the petitioner acted pursuant to religious con-
victions. However, the Court did state that resolving what constituted a religious belief must
not "turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to others to merit First
Amendment protection." Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec., 101 S. Ct. 1425,
1430 (1981).
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change is unimportant in the antitrust area. A religious antitrust ex-
emption will be claimed for the entire organization, not merely one
individual asserting a "personal conscience" claim. A Sherman Act
violation requires two elements: (1) sufficient agreement to consti-
tute a "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy"; and (2) a re-
straint of trade. 127 However, pursuant to the Supreme Court's
decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,128 the Act prohibits only
those agreements that impose an unreasonable restraint of trade.129
One individual or even a small religious group will not meet these
threshold antitrust violation elements and will not require an
exemption. 130
IV. A Proposed Test
Combining the current judicial attitude favoring religious ex-
emptions with the Supreme Court's support for first amendment
political action antitrust exemptions suggests the judiciary should
sustain a religion-based antitrust exemption. The Yoder decision re-
flects the Supreme Court's commitment to religious freedom. The
Noerr doctrine, although stressing the importance of the Sherman
Act, provides that certain politically motivated claims must be
granted antitrust exemptions. Religiously motivated claims should
receive the same treatment because both political freedom and reli-
gious freedom are fundamental rights in our system. In Swan, the
Ninth Circuit accorded religioup freedom the same deference as polit-
ical freedom and held that religiously motivated claims do require an
antitrust exemption.' 31 Although the Supreme Court has never con-
sidered a religious antitrust exemption, it should recognize that Swan
correctly decided the religion-antitrust conflict.
For the reasons discussed above,132 religion-based antitrust ex-
emption claims should not be subject to a balancing test. Instead,
courts should evaluate these claimed exemptions under a "religious
motivation" test:133 if the conduct constituting the alleged antitrust
127 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
128 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
129 Id at 58.
130 See note 71 supra.
131 The district court in Costello also indicated that religious claims require an antitrust
exemption. No. 76-1930 (D.D.C. August 22, 1980).
132 See notes 104-07 supra and accompanying text.
133 This test is similar to one recently proposed in the political boycott area. See Com-
ment, supra note 97, at 330.
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violation is primarily motivated by religion, courts must grant an an-
titrust exemption.
A. Defining Religion
Before courts can apply a religious motivation test, they must
define religion. In the area of religious exemptions from antitrust
laws134 the federal courts should adopt the following definition: reli-
gion is a belief in the existence of a Supreme Being or other authori-
tative supernatural influence along with an adherence to a set of
principles based on this authoritative source. The authoritative su-
pernatural influence may be strengthened by, but is not simply
equivalent to, personal conscience. Thus, the definition clearly en-
compasses religious traditions which believe in a single God such as
Catholicism and Judaism. It also encompasses nontheistic religions
such as Buddhism. It does not, however, include cults contending
that their "authoritative supernatural influence" is another human
being who requires adherence to particular philosophical beliefs.
Religion may be defined even more specifically in the negative.
Religion is not commercial activity. A religious claim may have com-
mercial overtones analogous to the commercial overtones in NOW;
however, these commercial goals will not negate the ultimate reli-
gious objective. Thus, even religious claims with commercial over-
tones fall within this definition of religion.
B. Relgious Motivation Test
Once courts adopt a definition of religion, determining whether
the conduct is religiously motivated will not be difficult. This step
requires an evaluation of the claimant's "actual motivation" but not
the religious claim's importance or historical basis. An exclusive in-
quiry into motivation avoids the difficult centrality distinction cur-
rently employed. 3 5
Expressly separating the motivational question from the defini-
tional question enables the court to evaluate more objectively the
claimed religious motivation. The court must question not whether
the belief is sincerely held but whether the.conduct is sincerely moti-
134 A definition appropriate for evaluating religion-based antitrust exemptions might dif-
fer from a definition applied to other claims under either the free exercise or establishment
clause. The Court should specify the applicability of its definition. Se L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6, at 827-28.
135 See notes 109-12 supra and accompanying text.
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vated by religious belief. For these purposes, the religion involved is
assumed legitimate.
Essentially, this "actual motivation" evaluation is analogous to
the sham exception in antitrust. 36 If the conduct, although falling
within the court's definition of religion, clearly indicates, "nothing
more than an attempt to interfere with the business relationship of a
competitor,"' 137 the court must not grant an antitrust exemption.
However, if the court determines that the claimant's conduct is moti-
vated primarily by religious rather than commercial considerations,
an antitrust exemption should be granted.
C. Application of the Test
The effect of the proposed test on religion-based antitrust ex-
emption cases can be demonstrated by applying that test to Costello.
The Costello result would then be altered because both factors in the
proposed test are met. 38 First, Catholicism falls within the suggested
definition of religion. Catholics believe in the existence of a Supreme
Being and adhere to a Biblical set of principles. Second, the neces-
sary religious motivation was present. The District Court specifically
found the requisite religiously motivated conduct and lack of a com-
mercially competitive motive.' 39 Thus, application of the proposed
test would have resulted in a religious antitrust exemption.
D. Benefts of the Test
The proposed test uses current case law in both the antitrust
exemption 40 and religious exemption areas"4' to alleviate the
problems inherent in the balancing test. 42 First, using the proposed
test, courts can avoid the unnecessary extensive intrusion into reli-
gious beliefs. 43 The inquiry into the religious claim need only con-
sider whether the claim is based on religion, not whether the claim is
"central" to the religion.
136 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
137 365 U.S. at 144.
138 See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra.
139 No. 80-2147, slip op. at 4.
140 See, e.g., Missouri v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied 101 S. Ct. 122 (1980); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508 (1972); UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
141 See e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664
(1970); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
142 See notes 104-07 supra and accompanying text.
143 See notes 109-12 supra and accompanying text.
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Second, by adopting the proposed definition of religion, the fed-
eral courts will be able to make principled decisions on claims for
religious exemptions. It remains difficult for courts to legitimately
evaluate religious claims without first articulating a definite standard
on which to base their evaluations.
Third, the new test substantially eliminates the excessive subjec-
tivity currently resulting from the balancing test.144 The test will
protect religious organizations' constitutionally required freedom
while decreasing the likelihood of biased decisions. Although evalu-
ating the "existence of a Supreme Being" might require a degree of
subjectivity, this degree will be comparatively small.
Fourth, the proposed test will not make the success of a boycott
or other religiously motivated activity the determinative issue in as-
sessing the exemption claims. 145 Thus, well-organized religions will
not receive preferential treatment in the religion-antitrust conflict.
Finally, the proposed test, unlike the balancing test, specifically
recognizes the possibility of fraudulent religious antitrust exemption
claims. If claims, although falling with the definition of religion,
qualify as "sham transactions", 46 the test requires these claims not
be exempt from antitrust regulation.
V. Conclusion
In our increasingly complex society, religion and competition
will continue to conflict. Precedent and policy dictate that relig-
iously motivated conduct be exempt from antitrust regulation.
When religiously motivated conduct infringes upon antitrust regula-
tion, however, the two must not be subjected to a balancing test.
Rather, courts should employ a test in which they first determine
whether a religion is involved, then determine whether the conduct is
religiously motivated. By using a religious motivation test courts will
avoid the numerous problems inherent in a balancing test.
Dana K Nache f
144 See note 113 supra and accompany text.
145 See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
146 See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
144 (1961). See text accompanying note 10 and notes 136-37 supra.
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